CONSIDERATIONS

SUBMITTED TO THE

PEOPLE OF IRELAND,

ON

Their Present Condition With Regard to

TRADE AND CONSTITUTION.

[redacted]

A PAMPHLET, lately [redacted]

ENTITLED,

"Observations on the [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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BRITISH MUSEUM

A

LETTER

TO THE

PEOPLE OF IRELAND.

HOWEVER diſinclined I feel myſelf to add any thing to the oppreſſion under which the public already groans from the weight of polemical politics, I cannot, as an Iriſhman, and a member of the Britiſh empire, ſuffer to paſs unnoticed a pamphlet which hath lately made its appearance amongſt us, under the title of "*Obſervations on the Mutiny-Bill, &c.*"

The materials of which this pamphlet is compoſed do not, in my judgment, rea-

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der it ſo formidable, as adventitious circumſtances do — the very high opinion juſtly and univerſally entertained of the talents and integrity of the Gentleman to whom this work is aſcribed, and the critical period of its publication, ſo very awful to the Britiſh empire, are conſiderations which would make it dangerous to deſpiſe a work of much leſs merit; becauſe the influence of theſe will give to plauſibility the effect of ſound reaſoning, and may, eventually, convert the fictitious woe, pictured by an heated imagination, into ſcenes of real tragedy.

The effuſion of human blood which has deſolated a conſiderable part of the Britiſh empire, may, in a great meaſure, be aſcribed to the effuſion of political ink; and when in this country, and at this time, a pamphlet is put forth, inſpiring the people with ſentiments of diſtruſt and of diſcontent; endeavouring to prove to them that their trade and conſtitution, which had been lately enlarged and ſecured in a degree exceeding

exceeding the example of all former times, are again *thrown back into suspense* by the treachery and venality of the parliament; and laying before the people, as matter of notoriety and unquestionable fact, the author's own suggestions of corrupt and criminal intercourse between the Castle and persons of the first rank and confidence in the country; exhibiting at the same time, under the affectation of general description, portraits, individually characterised—such a publication, I say, however it might be neglected in times of national security, is now a serious matter.

The author of the pamphlet must agree with me, that a condition of public affairs may arise, in which all considerations of domestic political concern will be suspended; and in which an opposition to the efforts of government, essential perhaps in general to the preservation of our constitution, will be considered, by virtuous men, as a fatal crime. The public will judge between him and me, whether or no that period be now arrived.

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Let no Iriſhman then ſuffer the glow of indignation, produced by the recollection of former contentions, ſo far to inflame his expectations at preſent, as to create in him a vain hope of exemption from the calamities which will attend England in her fall.

The kingdom of Ireland is no leſs appendant to the crown of England by law and conſtitution, than her fate is by ſituation to the fortunes of Great-Britain. She can riſe or fall but with them. This appendancy of Ireland to the crown of a *greater* country, in which country too the executive authority of both kingdoms, with its pomp and patronage, reſides, does neceſſarily create, without any malicious intent, a comparative inferiority; and this comparative inferiority has unavoidably appeared upon ſome occaſions in ſymptoms of partiality, no leſs, perhaps, in point of conſtitution than of trade—but does any man look for an Iriſh revolution?—does

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any Iriſhman wiſh that Ireland were out of the protection of England?

If neither of theſe be deſirable or expedient; and if it is obvious that the danger is truly alarming, to which the empire is now expoſed by a combination of the malignancy of its antient enemies, the ingratitude of its old allies, and the more lamentable ravages of a ſelf-waſting civil war.—If I ſay the condition of public affairs is ſuch that they ſeem to demand the interpoſition of ſomething above human power to avert the ruin of the ſtate; it muſt be admitted that this is not the ſeaſon for domeſtic complaint, but that to riſque the publication of any thing which may tend to diſaffect a part of what remains of the empire, altho' it ſhould be clothed in the robes of patriotiſm, *adjuſted by the hands of the graces themſelves*, will ſubject the author to the imputation of a confederacy with the common enemy againſt the ſtate; or, indeed, with the more deter-

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mined enemies of the country, the *British faction.*

I hope I ſhall find an excuſe in the feelings of my countrymen, if it ſhould be thought that, upon this ſubject, I expreſs myſelf too ſtrongly. The honour and credit of the Iriſh nation, in point of loyalty and gratitude, are at ſtake; and when I recollect the kind, the comprehenſive, the ſucceſsful manner, in which our concerns were managed, in the laſt ſeſſions of the Britiſh parliament, by one of the ableſt, and certainly one of the moſt liberal and benevolent miniſters Great Britain has ever been bleſt with; and when I perceive that the deareſt intereſts of this nation are again to be put to riſque in order to ſerve the purpoſes of intereſted individuals, I cannot repreſs the effuſions of my indignation.

A community capable of deliberate ingratitude is not likely to riſe into an illuſtrious nation. It is therefore become neceſſary

ceſſary that the people ſhould have all the information upon this ſubject, of which it is capable; that the ſound of diſcontent may not acquire additional force by reverberation, but that being confined within due limits, it may waſte its expiring murmurs, where it had its birth, in the cell of faction.

Our moſt gracious ſovereign, his miniſters, and the Britiſh nation muſt not be deceived, nor muſt the loyal kingdom of Ireland be traduced. Impreſſions concerning our people, and particularly our glorious volunteers, muſt not be permitted to be taken from the paintings of a man who views our political concerns through the medium of intemperate zeal, and who, impracticable himſelf, would give to our politics the ſame inflexibility which characterizes his own mind. Eager to accompliſh the freedom of Ireland, he ſeeks it in extremes, and, in the ſeverity of an unaccommodating ſpirit, he loſes the very end he would die to obtain. His arguments

ments and his ſentiments are retailed by others, who have an intereſt in agitating the people, and who, without virtue or talents themſelves, endeavour to find the road to public favour by a light reflected from his credit.

There is not perhaps in human experience a proof more demonſtrative of the imperfection of our nature, than that exhibited by the facility, which every pretender to public ſpirit finds in the acquiſition of popularity. No experience, no multiplication of example by examples, altho' the ſum touch upon the very limits of numerical extent, will put the people on their guard againſt impoſture. Every miniſter is a knave, and every patriot is a ſaint! the very benefits offered to the people by the firſt are frequently rejected as inſidious and deceitful, whilſt the moſt nauſeous compoſitions prepared by the latter are ſwallowed down, without examination, even to the dregs.

If

If time and experience, the great rectifiers of human error, had their efficacy when applied in a compariſon between miniſters and patriots, I would undertake to ſhew, from the hiſtory of our own country, ſince the Revolution, the example of ten honeſt miniſters, for that of one faithful patriot.

Miniſters indeed are unfairly dealt with, as will appear by conſidering the nature of their inſtitution. The neceſſity, which gave riſe to the origin of government, implies a reciprocalneſs of confidence between the governors and the governed, which the people are always too willing to forget. When man had forſaken a ſavage ſtate, and firſt reſolved to live in ſociety, it became neceſſary, that a portion of his native liberty ſhould be ſurrendered by each individual, for the advantage of the whole. They found that ſociety could not exiſt otherwiſe; for each man in a ſtate of unlimited freedom would be regulated in all things by his own will, and the

law of force alone would decide what was right and what was wrong. To remedy this they inſtituted certain rules to determine the conduct of every man towards another; which took from each a certain portion of his own will, or freedom. The depoſit of this code, together with the charge of the public affairs of the community, firſt conſtituted, in the hands of choſen perſons, what is called government; a dangerous, and invidious poſt in ſociety! ſubjecting the poſſeſſor to the ſuſpicions and machinations of all around him. It is the nature of man to hanker after his own free will; and to regard as inimical and odious the authority which deprives him of the unlimited uſe of it. This natural tendency to freedom has produced various combinations of powers in the ſtructure of the frame of different governments; but of all which ever did, or, perhaps, ever will exiſt, that of our own country is the moſt admirable—compared to all others it ſeems of divine origin, whilſt they bear the impreſſions of human infirmity.

mity. It extends protection, and distributes justice with unerring equality to all the subjects of the state.—They alone, who administer our government, seem doomed to persecution; and, of all persons in the realm, enjoy least the protection of the constitution. The minister of England is perhaps the man in the kingdom least benefited by its freedom, and is certainly the only man you may traduce with impunity. Like the eunuch of a seraglio he is fitted to superintend a treasure which he is disqualified to possess, and in an extensive scene of fruition he is the only person incapable of enjoyment. Our grand seignior, the people, too, treats him as the slave of despotism; for every delinquency in him is a state crime, and the minister's head is his lightest forfeit. Each man in the realm is born his accuser, for every man has an inheritance in the democracy of our government, and his vigilancy is exactly proportioned to the opinion he entertains of his interest in it. Tribunals are arbitrarily erected to try the ministers

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in every corner of the empire, and, what is moſt unpardonably unjuſt, he is condemned under laws, which do not judicially apply to his caſe; for we inſiſt upon ſquaring the miniſter's conduct in all things by the moſt rigid rules of ſtrict liberty, from which his very inſtitution, in the original frame of government, was a departure. We put him into a ſituation where he muſt be altogether governed by expediency; and we make him reſponſible, as if he had the entire uſe of free will.

In our conſtitution, a ſtranger to the nature of it would be inclined to think that government had been inſtituted with the ſame view that ſportſmen propagate foxes, for the pleaſure of hunting them down; and indeed it very often happens, that the country gentlemen, when they unkennel a miniſter, are as unconcerned about the miſchief they are likely to do the country, as the ſportſmen in the fox-chaſe are. The property of honeſt, induſ-

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trious people is found, in the end, to have ſuffered all the damage!

When I venture to offer to the people ſome conſiderations to induce them to a reaſonable degree of confidence in the perſons ordained to govern the ſtate, it is not my intention to put them off their guard, touching that vigilancy, which the ſpirit of the conſtitution demands peculiarly at their hands. I do not wiſh to lull the people into a political lethargy, but I would warn them againſt thoſe who want to "*ſting*" them into madneſs.—I would have them conſult their own experience, and they will diſcover "*a ſimple but great truth,*" that their undiſtinguiſhing patronage of all pretenders to public virtue is become the great evil of the conſtitution;—that corruption and public expence, pouring in by this paſſage, are likely to overwhelm and confound all things; and that in themſelves alone lies the remedy.

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The political, like the natural conſtitution, is liable to the invaſion of infirmity, but it is obſerved of both, that the final diſſolution, which inevitably awaits them, is the effect of a cauſe exiſting in the firſt principles of formation. Every government in the univerſe contains within itſelf the ſeeds of its own deſtruction.—*The facility of the people is the fatal malady of free governments.* The liberties of the cities of antient Greece, and thoſe of Rome expired under it; and ſo will our own: but as it is the duty of every man to prolong his natural life, tho' death is inevitable, ſo it is the part of a good citizen to deviſe the means of protracting the fate of our inestimable conſtitution. If a portion of that vigilancy, with which the people, very often unneceſſarily, torment and obſtruct government, were employed in ſcrutinizing the pretenſions of their various demagogues, the conſtitution would laſt the longer.

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It is a lamentable reflection, and one which infinitely mortifies the pride of man, that a form of government, ſo admirably excellent in its ſtructure, ſhould yet be found to be incapable of duration, and to derive its decay from that very principle, which ſeems the boaſt of its perfection.

If we inveſtigate the paſſions, by which the human mind is actuated, at two different periods of life, I am perſuaded a cloſe obſerver will diſcover the effect of an impulſe, which is nearly conſtant in nature, and which is gradually operating a derangement of the balance of our conſtitution—I mean the notable difference between the political ſentiments of our early life, and thoſe of our more mature age. The fine ardour of youth, prone to licenſe and impatient of reſtraint, views the exerciſe of power and authority with a jealous eye; and, as the ſame early glow directs the mind to purſuits, wherein fame and perſonal diſtinction are to be acquired, it generally

genetally happens that an outrageous opposition to the measures of government marks the first steps into life of our young men, and that parliament becomes the scene of their ambitious warfare. Being once entered into the vortex of party, a man is hurried rapidly and irresistibly along with it, whilst the applause of a "*listening senate*," and the huzzas of the people increasing the intoxication, leave him little leisure and less inclination for political reflection. When time, however, and a certain satiety bring him back to a review of his parliamentary conduct; when he reflects coolly on the immediate effects of it, and the consequences likely to follow, he begins to perceive that in his political journey he has been travelling astray; that he has been contributing to encrease the expences of his country, and the burdens of his fellow-citizens, without benefiting the constitution; and that, with the most pure and virtuous intentions, he has been little better than a pander in the profligacy and prostitution of others. Disgusted by the

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reflection, but unable to tread back his devious steps, disqualified by a privation of vigour to stem the torrent of more youthful eloquence, and thus compensate in old age for the follies of youth, he is reduced to be content to sit down by the side of administration, a silent voter for the remainder of his life, and to become an indignant witness of the mischiefs done the country by the rising generation. The motives of his change, misrepresented by interested demagogues, and misunderstood by the unreflecting people, are attributed to corruption and avarice, the characteristic features of old age. And thus, his youth having been spent in giving opposition to government, his old age becomes a reproach to it. The whole of his vigour having been exhausted in efforts to impede the progress of the wheels of the machine, he hangs a dead weight upon it at last; and in each period of his life contributes more or less to the injury of the constitution.

I perceive that I have been delayed in my progreſs towards the argument of the pamphlet, by ſentiments and reflections which lay in the way, but which appear to me to have ariſen, not unnaturally, out of the conſideration of the ſubject. The trenches being now opened, let us take a view of the fortification. This redoubtable pamphlet, containing a call the moſt peculiarly bold upon the ſpirit and feelings of the people of Ireland we have ever been acquainted with, is reared upon two great pillars of argument—the one concerning our trade, the other our conſtitution. Theſe are ſubjects with regard to which the people of Ireland are yet ſore. The ſudden and unexpected conceſſion to us of unlimited trade on the part of Great-Britain, after a violent and unjuſtifiable detention of it for above a century; that trade! by means of which ſhe became the miſtreſs and the wonder of the world; that trade! for the excluſive enjoyment of which her legiſlature has endeavoured at every riſque to vindicate a ſupremacy over the ſubordinate

ſubordinate parts of the empire; that trade! on account of the uſurpation of which ſhe has lived in jealouſy and enmity with us for a century paſt; that ſhe ſhould ſo ſuddenly, ſo generouſly, and ſo equally admit us into a participation of that trade with her, is a matter we ſo little expected, that we ſcarcely believe her ſincere in it; and the aſtoniſhed Iriſhman receives the boon, as Scrub does Archer's generoſity in the play — "*Ay! it is a guinea, by this light! but I ſuppoſe, brother Martin, you expect one and twenty ſhillings in change.*"

The motives of policy which determined the miniſter of England to open the trade of Ireland at this time particularly, are well underſtood, but foreign to my preſent purpoſe. I muſt however obſerve, that, under this national tendency to ſuſpicion, the arguments urged upon the public in this pamphlet, with a degree of the moſt enthuſiaſtic fire, and backed by the credit of one of the moſt reſpectable members of the ſtate, become formidable to an antagoniſt, and will

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be encountered under fearful odds—I feel that I have men's prejudices and paſſions to contend with, but I appeal to their reaſon only.

"*No people*, ſays the author of the pamphlet, "*will be ſatisfied who conceive themſelves cheated of a free grant of trade, and ſee a conſtitution reſcued out of the hands of one parliament to be mangled by another.*" Here is the ground of the complaint of the pamphlet—the grant of free trade the author ſuppoſes to be entirely defeated, by means of an inadequate duty laid by our parliament on refined ſugars imported here from Great-Britain; and all the advantages derived to the conſtitution of Ireland in the previous part of the laſt ſeſſions of our parliament, he argues to have been loſt in the end of it, by the nature of the Mutiny Bill. In ſhort we are to believe that, under a co-operation of deceit and corruption, the Iriſh nation hath been cajoled of trade, which had been promiſed her in extent; and fruſtrated of conſtitution, which ſhe had

had conceived hopes of accompliſhing; that ſhe had been tricked by government, and betrayed by parliament. The queſtion of trade, although moſt materially neceſſary to be proved, the author thinks fit to leave untouched. He aſſumes it as clear to all the world; and relying on the feelings of the people for the ſucceſs of this irrational aſſumption, he makes it one of the two great columns which ſupport his fabric. It were perhaps a ſufficient anſwer to his pamphlet, to enter into the queſtion of the equalization duty on ſugars, and to ſhew that there never was a more impudent! a more ſelfiſh! nor a more unjuſtly founded outcry, than that raiſed by the Sugar-Bakers of Ireland, the Committee of Merchants of Dublin, and their Abettors, on the ſubject of the Sugar-duty! That the duty, as now ſettled by the Iriſh parliament, is conſiderably in favour of the Iriſh manufacturer, on the exact footing of equalization—which was the condition of the grant of the Weſt-India trade to Ireland; and that, if the demand of the Sugar-Bakers and the

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Committee of Merchants had been complied with by our parliament, it would have been extremely injurious to this kingdom, as well as a breach of parliamentary faith and honour. The proofs, I say, fully exhibited with regard to this question, would be a proper answer to the whole of a pamphlet which comes forth to inflame the people on the subject of public grievances; because, when it were shewn that the first and most important of these grievances, exists but in the ignorance of the author, and the deceit of the persons interested in the trade, it would naturally condemn his complaint as frivolous and groundless. This task, however, I will reserve for another occasion, no less on account of its bulk, than that I may not appear to avoid the author at present; and this duty, I pledge myself to my fellow-citizens, I will not delay, being induced to it by two considerations; first, lest the assertions of the Sugar-Bakers, &c. receiving confirmation from so great an authority as the writer of the pamphlet, should

ſhould thereby gain credit with the public, to the abuſe of truth and juſtice; and, ſecondly, on account of the inſufficiency of two pamphlets, which have been already publiſhed on the ſubject of the ſugar duty here, the authors of which appear to me not to have had all the information upon it neceſſary to give thorough conviction.

Now as to the Mutiny Bill, by which, according to our author, Ireland has loſt her conſtitution, let us ſee how far his reaſoning is concluſive. In every government, however ſimple, or however modified, the purſe and the ſword are the two great operative ſprings of the machine. All motion and efficacy proceeding from them, it neceſſarily follows that in the exact proportion of the power of theſe will the ſtate be formidable abroad; and in the proportion of limitation, exactly, by which the executive authority is reſtrained in the uſe or abuſe of them at home, will the conſtitution be free, or the contrary. In vain will the people affect to hold their independency

dependency by the ſtrings of the purſe, if the power of the ſword ſhall be unlimited in the hands of the chief magiſtrate; for an army will as readily levy contributions in their native as in an enemy's country. Therefore it is that, ſince a ſtanding army has become an indiſpenſable part of the political arrangement of Great Britain, the repreſentatives in parliament of the people of England have contrived, as much as poſſibly they could, conſiſtent with the neceſſity of confiding the command and patronage of the army uncontroulably to the executive authority, to make the army a parliamentary army, by rendering it dependent on parliament from year to year, as well for its pay, as for the code of laws by which alone it can be regulated. The conſtitution reaſons thus:—If, within a year, the day ſhall come, when the crown will neither have money to pay nor law to regulate the army, unleſs parliament ſhall think fit to renew the grant of both, the army will diſband itſelf. By this diſtribution of power the executive authority

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has the effectual uſe of the ſword for the defence of the country againſt foreign enemies; and the parliament is enabled to render the ſword, in the hand of the prince, innoxious with regard to the liberties of the people. So much of the conſtitution of England I have thought it expedient to ſtate, as the whole of the author's reaſonings applies to it. I will now endeavour to collect his argument, as it lies diffuſed in that luxuriancy of aphoriſmatic declamation, which at once makes the ornament and protection of the author's opinions; impetuouſly hurrying the reader down the rapid current of his eloquence, whilſt it ſpreads difficulty and delay in the way of his purſuers. I am ſure he will loſe no part of his ſtrength by concentration.

The caution and prudence, argues the author, in which the democracy of England has encircled the purſe and the ſword are altogether neglected in the proviſion made for the ſecurity of public liberty in Ireland. The crown, already in poſſeſſion of a per-

petual hereditary revenue, independent of parliament; with a law for collecting thereof, eventually perpetual, by means of the clauſe which enacts, that it ſhall continue in force to the end of the then next ſeſſions of parliament, was moſt improvidently accommodated in the laſt ſeſſions of our parliament, with a mutiny law for the regulation of the forces in Ireland, likewiſe perpetual. This combination, argues the author, leaves the conſtitution of Ireland at the mercy of the crown; for the King, having no urgency in his own neceſſities for calling a parliament in Ireland, will naturally wiſh to get rid of thoſe troubleſome partners of his power;—and the parliament being diſcontinued, his hereditary revenue, already £600,000. per annum, will enormouſly encreaſe from the increaſe of imports, which will take place under the abolition of the additional duties. His civil exigencies will vaniſh with his parliament; for parliamentary corruption, and the civil eſtabliſhment, the two great ſources

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of expence, according to our author, will march off, hand in hand, and the whole revenue of the kingdom will then be in the graſp of the prince, and applicable to his military purpoſes ſolely.

The army in Ireland being thus eſtabliſhed upon a perpetual revenue, adequate to its ſupport, and a perpetual law conſtitutionally provided for the regulation of it, the crown is invited to diſſolve the conſtitution of Ireland. Let us hear the author's own words:—"*To arm the chief magiſtrate, or rather indeed to arm the claims of the Britiſh parliament with a perpetual law for the regulation and accommodation of any indefinite number of troops his Majeſty is pleaſed to keep up in Ireland, appears to me a meaſure of an unwarrantable and unſeaſonable, corrupt and a crazy confidence.*

"*I muſt obſerve that the army thus rendered by your law unconfined in its numbers, and by the ſame law made independent of parliament for its regulation, however brave and*

and respectable, is not a native army, but of that very country which claims to make laws for Ireland; also I must observe that the minister who in fact governs that army, is the British minister, not responsible to your parliament, nor resident in your country: so that now by this pernicious bill, this minister, a foreign and contemptuous character, in a safe and distant capacity, free from the controul of an expirable authority, may send into this country any number of troops which the return of his pride may require, the collected strength of the empire at the close of the war shall be able to furnish, and he may billet them upon you in execution of any project of power, or avarice, or revenge, to collect a British tax, or disperse an Irish association, or trample on an Irish spirit; and the people of this country have the mortification to think that they may by their own law, a law grafted on their best exertions, be obliged to billet and accommodate troops quartered upon them for their destruction: or though his Majesty's ministers may not choose to come to extremity, yet may they gradually and at their leisure, armed

with our law and encouraged by our humiliations, raiſe new regiments, a meaſure both of corruption and force; or throw into this kingdom ſuch a body of troops as may break her ſpirit, watch her motions, controul her free action, and finally make thoſe who before thought it inexpedient to deny, ſoon think it inexpedient to reſiſt, the uſurped authority of the Britiſh parliament.—I ſay, the miniſter may do this at his leiſure, and build by degrees a ſyſtem of tyranny on the foundation of our own law."

After the author has thus ſhewn the dangers to which, by this law, the liberties of Ireland are expoſed, he very kindly turns his thoughts towards protecting the freedom of the legiſlature of Great Britain againſt the effects of it; a conduct very generous in an Iriſh patriot, conſidering that, under his own ſtating, Ireland can incur the miſchiefs ariſing from the law only through the ambition of the Engliſh legiſlature, or the ſelf-intereſtedneſs of the Britiſh people.

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" *A military government*, (ſays he) *being thus eſtabliſhed in Ireland, if the Britiſh parliament ſhall hereafter attempt to control a military prince by the power which ſhe conceives is reſerved by her Annual Mutiny Bill, her intention may be fruſtrated by our law, the Britiſh troops illegal in England may be removed to Ireland and kept up here againſt her, the limitation of her law is repealed in the perpetual duration of ours, its purpoſe loſt, and this iſland formed into an immenſe barrack to accommodate the military ambition of ſome king in his defiance of the Britiſh nation in the unconſtitutional continuation, and violent application of his army.*"

This Iriſh Mutiny Law is an extraordinary agent. Firſt, it is an inſtrument for enforcing the claims of the Britiſh parliament over the independency of Ireland; and, *preſto*, in the ſame moment it is the inſtrument of the deſtruction of that very parliament.

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The author's next lamentation turns upon the hardſhips and violence of this act with regard to the military people themſelves; and in the very ſame page he records the numerous outrages committed lately by the ſoldiers in Ireland, in order, I preſume, to prove that daily outrage does not require perpetual reſtraint.

He next argues that the parliament of Ireland, being octennial in its own duration, exceeded the limits of its power when it enacted this law perpetually; as it did likewiſe when it adopted that clauſe of the Engliſh Mutiny-bill, giving to the crown a power of adding articles of war not extending to life or limb.

This is the whole of the author's complaint, upon which an invocation to the people, particularly the volunteers, of Ireland is founded—exciting them, not very indirectly, to exertions of efficacy and of vengeance. It is not my purpoſe to examine too nicely the intention of this call, I will

I will not ſcrutinize with the ſeverity of a crown-lawyer the tendency of his hint to the volunteers, that the queſtion of the legality of an army of ſelf-conſtituted and ſelf-diſciplined militia in the land, diſclaiming the control of the executive authority of the ſtate, "*is loſt in their numbers.*" I know that it is not neceſſary, for I have the fulleſt conviction that the noble and ardent ſpirit, ſo remarkably high at this time in the kingdom, is the comfortable ſource of ſecurity no leſs of the peace and property of the inhabitants of the kingdom, than of the rights of his majeſty's crown of Ireland. But before I go further, I muſt take notice of two aſſertions contained in the argument, and which have ariſen, I apprehend, from miſinformation and miſtake—the one, that whilſt Great-Britain affected to give up the queſtion of legiſlative ſupremacy over Ireland by permitting us to originate a Mutiny-law for ourſelves, ſhe had named Ireland in the proviſions of her own Mutiny-law. The other,

other, that the crown has a power of encreaſing the troops in Ireland *indefinitely*.

As to the firſt, the ink is ſcarcely dry when the fact has belied the aſſertion. The Mutiny-bill of England has paſſed the legiſlature without any ſuch clauſe. Our good patriotic friends indeed, in the oppoſition there, were willing to have the bill recommitted for the purpoſe of including Ireland; and, I preſume, the information to this country that it would be included, muſt have originated from thoſe who were determined that it ſhould—Mr. Fox boaſts that he has connections in Ireland. As to the ſecond aſſertion, that the king may encreaſe the forces of Ireland *indefinitely*, I beg leave to aſk by what authority? I am ſure the Iriſh Mutiny-bill communicates no ſuch power. If he is poſſeſſed of it, he certainly had it before the mutiny law exiſted in Ireland, and it is therefore out of the queſtion; but I did always, and do ſtill believe, that the crown cannot add a ſingle ſoldier to the eſtabliſhment of ei-

ther country, without the consent of parliament.

But let us examine the great and important part of the author's argument—I mean that which relates to the liberties of Ireland. The prince, provided with an independent revenue, a numerous army, and a perpetual law to regulate that army, may discontinue the Irish parliaments, and rule by his own will. This subject deserves very serious consideration. And first I beg leave to ask the author some plain questions—Will Great-Britain look quietly on, and see the king of England employ the army of the empire to such purpose? Will the parliament of England entertain no fellow-feeling for the parliament of Ireland? Will the parliament of England be free from apprehensions for its own fate, when the king of both kingdoms, armed with the favours lavished upon him by his Irish parliament, shall so openly and so ungratefully employ those very favours to the extermination of that parliament? Do not princes

as well as subjects read history, or are their minds alone impervious to the lessons of instructions contained therein? The discontinuance of parliaments, and royal martyrizing are connected passages in the page of our records, and the knowledge of this circumstance, aided by the practice of modern patriotism, hath taught our princes how much more safe and effectual it is to retain than to disband a parliament.

The liberties of these countries may be yielded up by the people, but they will never be ravished from them. A choice of evils at some future day, I trust it is remote, may possibly determine the people to surrender at discretion, and in despair to prefer the dominion of one master to that of five hundred.

But is the author's argument of our danger founded under his own premises? I apprehend not.

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The king of Ireland will collect the army of the empire in Ireland, he will keep them there under the perpetuity of the Irish Mutiny-law, he will discontinue his Irish parliament, and maintain this army and himself by means of his hereditary revenue. It is fair to enquire what effect this will produce. When he shall disband the parliament, his hereditary revenue will be then his only resource. Thence he must draw the means to pay this indefinite number of troops, out of this fund he must maintain the civil establishment, as well as discharge the annual interest of the national debt.

The amount of the pay of his troops we cannot ascertain, for their number is indefinite; the expences of the civil establishment are about £169,000 per annum; the amount of the interest of the funded debt £105,000; and the expence of collecting the revenue is £158,000, making in all £432,000 per annum, which being deducted from £600,000, the present amount

amount of the hereditary revenue, will leave the mighty ſum of £168,000 per annum to pay this numerous army and maintain the prince in Ireland. Here will be no budget to open, no new loans to ſupply deficiencies, for there is neither parliamentary proviſion of loan duties to diſcharge the intereſt, nor national ſecurity in the faith of parliament to induce a lending; œconomy has kicked theſe out of doors. Will a pitiful revenue then of £168,000 be ſufficient to effect a ſubjection of this kingdom? It is trifling with men's underſtanding to offer them ſuch ridiculous ground of apprehenſion! But our author will ſay, that it is no part of his plan to maintain the civil eſtabliſhment, nor to provide the intereſt of the nation's debt—Then behold how he multiplies the difficulties of the prince!

The king of Ireland, relying on the ſupport of his hereditary revenue, diſcontinues his parliament, ſuffers the civil eſtabliſhment

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of the kingdom to fall to the ground, and leaves the public creditors to ſtarve for want of the intereſt of their money. A ſtate of lawleſs anarchy and confuſion in the country is the ſmalleſt evil reſulting to the prince from this ſyſtem; the want of the ordinary diſtribution of juſtice will be ſupplied by martial law; but will he have nothing to fear from the multiplication of enemies upon his hands? The members of the two houſes of parliament and their adherents, all the perſons ſupported by the civil eſtabliſhment and their dependants, with the public creditors and their connections, will form an hoſt comprehending nearly the ſtrength of the whole kingdom. The king would have occaſion for an indefinite number of troops indeed to keep ſuch a body of enemies quiet, and to ſupport ſuch a government. And with what does he encounter all this! the amount of his hereditary revenue. Let us ſee what this hereditary revenue is. The groſs produce of it at preſent is about £600,000 per annum, of this nearly £400,000 ariſes from

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customs and excise on the import of articles of luxury merely.—The hearth-money produces about £61,000, and the quit-rents about £65,000.—The residue comes in by the inland excise. So that, except £126,000. the amount of the hearth-money and quit-rents, the whole of the hereditary revenue depends on commerce, and arises chiefly upon articles of luxury.

In the state of confusion produced by the author's plan, will commerce of any kind exist in the country, will importations at all take place, or will the subjects of Ireland import articles of luxury merely to produce a revenue to the Crown, to be employed in the purposes of their own subjection? Did not a late non-importation agreement in this kingdom, partially taken up and not very rigorously insisted upon, exclude nearly all the articles which were the object of the people's resentment at the time; and finally bring the very manufacturers of Great-Britain to a sense of our rights? And will not such an agreement

ment be more certain and operative, when the occaſion for entering into it ſhall be more important and preſſing? Will the people neglect to confederate when in the facility of a non-importation agreement alone they ſhall find perfect ſecurity againſt ſlavery, and at the ſame time annihilate the only reſource of their tyrant?

In this point of view I have always conſidered the hereditary revenue of Ireland as a very innocent depoſit in the hands of the Crown. The grant of it indeed is formally out of the reſtraint of parliament, but the payment of it is virtually within the will of the people.

It is perhaps not very eſſential to remark that the circumſtances of perpetuity in laws made for the regulation of the forces in Ireland is not novel. All that have been enacted here for that purpoſe are perpetual. The 6th of Ann providing certain accommodation for ſoldiers on their march, is a perpetual law.—So is the 4th

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of George I. providing barracks and veſting the property of ſuch barracks in the Crown for ever.

There is no poſſible way of turning the argument of this pamphlet, that it does not preſent a miſerable frame of flimſy ſtructure. It is the fanaticiſm of public virtue, holding up to its votaries the diſtorted viſions and ſpectres of its own ſuperſtition, terrific indeed to the view, but which, brought to the teſt of palpability, elude the touch, and melt in idle air.

The author's apprehenſions concerning the conſtitution of England, endangered, as he ſtates, by this law, are equally vain and groundleſs.

Ireland, argues he, dangerouſly ſituated in the vicinage of England, may be made, under this law, a place of arms by an ambitious military prince for the deſtruction of the liberties of Great-Britain; that is, all the troops of the empire, being collected

in Ireland, may be infidiously prepared there to pounce unawares upon the parliament and people of Great-Britain, to the extinction of laws, liberty, and conſtitution? And pray was not the ſcheme as practicable before the Iriſh Mutiny Law had exiſtence? The Crown, by its ſole prerogative may tranſport the forces to any part of the empire at will. The army if it had been collected in Ireland would have been kept together there by the Engliſh Mutiny Law, which had been heretofore ſuppoſed to have force in Ireland, and all the purpoſes had been as effectually executed before as now. No, argues the pamphlet, for the army would have been diſbanded by the expiration of the Mutiny Law, before the project could be ripe; whereas the perpetuity of the Iriſh act, by enduring the authority of the prince over the army inexpirable, eludes the caution of the Britiſh conſtitution and deſtroys it. In the firſt place, I humbly apprehend the project of ſuch a revolution may as eaſily be executed in the ſpace of two years, as

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in that of two thouſand, but let us try if the prudence of the Britiſh Mutiny Law does not exiſt in the Iriſh Mutiny Bill, for which purpoſe let us examine what the Iriſh Mutiny Bill is.

The Iriſh Mutiny Bill is a law, which enacts, That, hereafter, the forces in Ireland ſhall be governed by his Majeſty's articles of war.—What is that which we call the articles of war? A portion of an Engliſh act of parliament enacted from year to year in the parliament of Great-Britain for the regulation of the army. Let the Britiſh parliament then but withhold the articles of war, and the perpetual Iriſh Mutiny Bill becomes abſolutely dead letter; for it has no application. Thus we ſee that nothing can be more effectual than the reſource is, which Great-Britain poſſeſſes againſt the dangers of the perpetuity of the Iriſh Mutiny Law.

I am aware that it will be objected to me, that this power, retained in Great-Britain,

Britain, of withholding at will the articles of war, by which the Irish army is to be regulated, is an uſurpation upon the Iriſh legiſlature, who might have enacted their own articles of war. In anſwer to this I will not reſort to the trifling arguments of uniformity of diſcipline, imperial army, &c. &c. They are idle; but I will confeſs that I am highly pleaſed with a contrivance which, by a communion of intereſts, lays the only conſtitutional foundation of union we have ever had between the two iſlands.—I would to God it were more extenſive and indiſſoluble! The army, tho' not imperial, is the army of the empire. In its foreign ſucceſſes each country has an hope to gratify; in the poſſibility of domeſtic injury from it, each country ſtakes a fear. The authority over the army of Ireland then ſhould, as much as poſſible, be communicable; at leaſt England, as ſhe is liable to the miſchief, ſhould have ſome remedy. Now in as much as England and Ireland in this view of common hopes

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and ſeem form but one body, liable to be affected by the ſame danger, exemption from that danger is better ſecured to both by a participation of control.—For, take notice they have a common enemy in the ambition of the prince to whoſe command the army is conſtitutionally obedient. The eſtabliſhment of the Iriſh army, the proviſion for its ſupport, and the law to regulate it, proceed from the parliament of Ireland; but the parliament of England retains a check in its hand influencing the duration of that army, and this is perfectly conſiſtent with the conſtitutional attributes of the Iriſh parliament.

The Engliſh parliament meddles not in our taxation; it demands no influence in our ſeparate legiſlation. Theſe are our own concerns,—without excluſive ſupremacy in them we ſhould not be free.—But the continuance of the army of Ireland is a joint concern.—It is not a ſeparate attribute of the excluſive legiſlation of Ireland, it is the object of the care of the empire,

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and the continuance of the army of Ireland, under circumſtances of eventual poſſibility, would be ruinous to Engliſh liberty, and perhaps to our own. The people of England, by perſeverance in caution and jealouſy of power, have acquired a great conſtitution; they have participated that conſtitution with us, becauſe we are their fellow-ſubjects under the ſame king, or rather they have lent us the model of their conſtitution.—They had been fools indeed if they had made us fellow-ſubjects, with a power to arm the crown, at our pleaſure, againſt their liberties. The operation of this principle was perhaps too ſtrongly marked in the conduct of the late Lord Chatham on a particular occaſion. In the year 1769, upon a requiſition of the Crown, an augmentation of the forces in Ireland was voted in the Iriſh parliament, not however without a previous permiſſion in a Britiſh ſtatute. Lord Chatham then in oppoſition, having conſidered this Iriſh proceeding as a ſpecies of ſeparate national eſtabliſh-

eſtabliſhment of the Iriſh army, by the parliament of Ireland, threatened the miniſter's head who had permitted it; and, in the effuſion of his eloquence, lamented the loſs ſuſtained by the conſtitution in the following figurative expreſſion: *That the miniſter had permitted the ſtrongeſt feather to be plucked from the wing of the Britiſh eagle.*

I perceive it will be objected, that in the relative power of the parliament of England conſiſts our weakneſs—that the ambition of that parliament to extend its ſupremacy over Ireland, is what we have moſt to fear, and that on this account any interference with the Iriſh army, even remotely, ſhould not be permitted to the Britiſh parliament.

To this I anſwer, that our danger, on this head, is not increaſed by the control over the duration of our Mutiny Bill, communicated thro' the articles of war; nor is the power of the Britiſh parliament over

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us in any degree augmented by it. It is in the number, the diſcipline, and the application of the army, that the danger of the army conſiſts; and the Britiſh parliament poſſeſſes no power with regard to any of theſe. The Britiſh parliament as well as our own, has an intereſt in watching the prince's ambition, and the uſe he ſhall make, or meditate to make, of his army. There is but one poſſible ſuppoſition of caſe wherein the entire control over the duration of our own army were better in our own hands; I mean in the caſe of a combination of intereſts between the parliament of England, the people of England, and the king of Ireland, to deſtroy our freedom. If that unnatural combination ſhall ever take place, the queſtion will ceaſe to be ſpeculative. All will be reduced to the queſtion of force, between the two nations, wherein parchment barriers will little avail either. Great-Britain on her part has the very ſame combination in Ireland to guard againſt.

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I muſt obſerve that this mode which has been adopted, of checking the duration of the Iriſh army, by a remote power depoſited in the care of the Britiſh parliament, out of whoſe hands the Iriſh army has been lately taken by our Mutiny-law, is perfectly analogous to the ſcheme of our conſtitution itſelf. The jealouſy and control of ſeparate powers, having the ſame intereſt by a communion of hopes and fears, in the duration of the conſtitution is the characteriſtic principle of it. The remainder of the author's arguments will require little or no trouble.

The hardſhips impoſed on the military people themſelves by the perpetuity of the Iriſh Mutiny-law, may be remedied when they ſhall complain of them. They will be beſt known by experience, and a premature interference in moſt caſes produces imperfect remedy. I muſt obſerve however, that, in my humble opinion, the author's care of the military is ſomewhat miſplaced. If danger to our liberties is threatened from a ſtanding army in the degree

the author repreſents, the more numerous the difficulties are which ſurround a military life, the leſs encouragement will there be to enter into it, and the ſafer will our freedom be on account of theſe difficulties; ſo that in truth he has altogether miſtaken this part of his premiſes.

Concerning his argument, that the parliament being octennial, had exceeded the limits of its power when it enacted a perpetual Mutiny-law—although I think his ground uncommonly weak, I am very unwilling to indulge him by a conteſt. Appeals from the operations of parliament to the judgment of the people, I hold to be ſerious things. They are our laſt reſource againſt the very extent of the worſt complication of conſtitutional depravity, and ſhould not be weakened by idle uſe or miſapplication. Beſides it would be ſubmitting to an impoſition to give him a ſecond chance for the event of a queſtion which has already been decided againſt him. Preſent himſelf in parliament on the

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day of debate, *et cujus "pars magna" fuit*— the iſſue which he then knit has precluded him from demurring upon the ground of the illegality of the aſſumption of the parliament. His preſent appeal is an inſult to parliament, and to diſcuſs it with him were to become his accomplice in a dangerous ſcene of mockery.

As to his objection to the clauſe, granting to his majeſty a power of ſuperadding articles of war, not extending to life or limb, to thoſe approved of in parliament; I will only remark, that the clauſe is exactly copied from the Britiſh ſtatute, a ſtatute enacted in the ſeaſon of the full-blown jealouſy and vigilancy of the Britiſh people. The neceſſity for ſuch a diſcretionary power in the executive authority, I preſume, does exiſt; and certainly he has no right to queſtion it here; for a Mutiny-bill, as in England, was the object of the purſuit of him and his party in parliament, and he cannot juſtly complain of ſuch parts of the

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Iriſh law as are true copies of what he himſelf ſought.

Having endeavoured to convince my countrymen of the futility of theſe prophetic illuſions held forth by the pamphlet, I beg their attention for a moment, whilſt, in my turn, I try to diſcover ſome advantages derived to Ireland by means of the Mutiny-bill, and peculiarly by means of its perpetuity. The deſign of the Mutiny-law in Ireland had a two-fold end. In one point of its operation it was intended to vindicate the excluſive ſupremacy of the Iriſh parliament over the kingdom of Ireland, by *a ſolemn act*, and the complete acquieſcence of Great-Britain in that act, proves the firſt end to be fully attained; ſo that with regard to the exoluſive ſupremacy of the Iriſh legiſlature over Ireland, the Mutiny-law is perfectly a *charter*.

The other end in contemplation was, to take the legiſlative eſtabliſhment of our army out of the authority of Great-Britain, and

and to hand it over where it ought to be—to the parliament of Ireland. This end has likewiſe been attained, not the leſs effectually becauſe innoxiouſly to the liberties of Great-Britain.

The comprehenſive deſign of compaſſing theſe two important ends by one not very alarming meaſure, was an effort of wiſdom above my praiſe, and one for which Mr. Buſhe deſerves a ſtatue in his country! He prudently took advantage of England's diſtreſſed ſituation to extort from her a dereliction, which, though it might alarm her pride, could not weaken her powers. He embraced the lucky occaſion of procuring for Ireland a conſtitution when it was not very convenient for England to refuſe to grant it. This will be beſt underſtood by reflecting on the defects in our conſtitution which have been remedied by this law.

Before Great-Britain had acquieſced in our Mutiny Law, and before ſhe had ſealed the contract of her acquieſcence by leaving Ireland

Ireland out in the proviſions of her own, the legiſlation of Ireland was actually participated by the parliaments of the two countries, and taxation itſelf, tho' not yet ventured upon, was but ſuſpended over our heads. The ſwaggering fulminations of Bully Rigby, on this ſubject, in the Britiſh ſenate, like the diſtant rumblings of Jupiter, ſerved to remind our mortal parliament of its own imperfect nature, and forbad it to attribute to itſelf any greater ſhare of omnipotency thant hat which the adulation of poetry had long ſince proſtituted upon Auguſtus,—*diviſum imperium cum Jove Cæſar habet.* The caſe is now altered by means of this law. We have in it a charter of our excluſive parliamentary attributes; and we have that charter perpetually. Had the law been expirable, the charter of our excluſive ſupremacy would be precarious.—Sent into England every two years for the royal aſſent, a fit of returning pride, or a bettered condition of their affairs, might induce the Crown to with-

withhold the aſſent, our charter would then fall to the ground, and we ſhould have no right to complain; for it would undergo a conſtitutional fate: whereas any attempt on the part of Great-Britain to revoke it, in its preſent condition, will be an unconſtitutional violence, and a direct declaration of war.

Another defect in our conſtitution, remedied by this law, was that of the military eſtabliſhment. It was a galling circumſtance of our abject condition, that the army in this kingdom, ſupported by its revenues, was not an Iriſh army, but an army of Engliſh inſtitution and government, quartered upon us without even the ceremony or dignity of a Britiſh act of parliament, but by a negatively permiſſive clauſe alone in the Engliſh ſtatute 10th William III.

In reſpect to its military eſtabliſhment, Ireland, before the enacting of her own Mutiny Law, had more the appearance of

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an unemancipated province than that of an imperial free kingdom. With an army of 15,000 men quartered upon her by that very parliament which actually presumed to legislate for her, and talked eventually of taxing her, could she be said to possess any constitution at all? By means of the Mutiny Law her exclusive legislation is, in my opinion, effectually vindicated, and the Irish army becomes her own. Had the Irish parliament rejected the Mutiny Bill, in its altered state, on its return from England, they would have done very wrong, for they would have lost the first advantage; the alteration appears to have made our legislative security more perfect, and the evil with regard to the military was a very doubtful speculation. With what propriety or decency then can the author of the pamphlet presume to disgrace the present parliament in the eyes of their constituents?—"*When the period of this parliament shall arrive,*" will they not be able to say to their constituents—You entrusted

truſted to our care a conſtitution fraught with imperfections, we reſtore one to you nearly perfect. At the commencement of our truſt you were liable to have laws made for you by a foreign parliament, and your property was threatened to be taxed by the ſame authority. From theſe dreadful evils have we delivered you, without blood or conteſt. An army which was quartered upon you, and which, as you were obliged to maintain it, could be conſidered with regard to you only as an army of free-booters in your country, we have made your own army. Your own in point of eſtabliſhment, in point of proviſion, and of regulation. Added to all this, it has been our peculiar happineſs to ſee, during the adminiſtration of our truſt, the trade of the univerſe newly and unexpectedly laid open to your country, and to ſee induſtry and commerce begin to flouriſh in the land. Theſe will be the comfortable reflections of the perſons who compoſe the preſent parliament of Ireland, and hiſtorical compariſon will do juſtice to their memory.

Having now conſidered the argument of this pamphlet in the points of view, wherein it might be ſuppoſed to create vain apprehenſions in the minds of the people; I would moſt willingly take my leave of it, did not a reſpect for the moral intercourſe of ſociety render it neceſſary to take ſome notice of certain paſſages in the pamphlet, which, I am perſuaded, are to be aſcribed to the zeal of the author rather than to a deliberate purpoſe of doing public miſchief, or of gratifying perſonal feeling. The paſſages of the nature I allude to occur frequently in the pamphlet: two alone of them I tranſcribe for example. The 1ſt is as follows:

"*They whoſe friends had been neglected, or whoſe written propoſals of a very corrupt nature had not been complied with, and who whilſt that diſguſt, had oppoſed Lord Buckingham on the ſubject of commerce, now, having made up matters with the court, oppoſe the people on the ſubject of liberty. They who have been accuſtomed to make private ad-*

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vantage of public injuries, and who supported their retainers on their suffrages, blessed indeed with ample property, but by a servile following made dependent upon government, opposed the return of your liberty as they had until hurried away in the tide of 1779, opposed the extension of your trade. They charged your struggle for liberty as a design against property, a conspiracy to rob the great by a pillaging commonalty; they made this charge with the style and air of authority, as if property intitled the proprietor not only to sell himself, but to sell and load the public with his comrades and sycophants, and added consequence and consecration to such infamous traffic. They who hated the people from whom they had just proceeded, they who had little principle and no property, except your spoil, they who fear lest this kingdom should become too considerable to be bought and sold; all those who flourish in a province, and would sink in a nation, that interior species of plausible character actuated by little objects and a weak intellect, formed to shine in a court but shrilev in a free country, fell into the

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ſame idle, inſolent, conceited way of talking." Vide "*Obſervations on the Mutiny Bill,*" p. 39.

The 2d runs thus:

"*If any thing could aggravate ſuch a meaſure, it is the conſideration that the motive was as profligate as the law was miſchievous; and that this bill has been accompanied as it was produced by a moſt profuſe application of honours and a faithleſs application of money. We have ſeen its conſcientious ſupporters paid for their vote, either in their own perſon or in that of their friends; or publicly balked when they expected to be bribed. The Houſe of Commons was actually canvaſſed, and men deſperate of corruption were ſolicited once more into their original ſtate of mendicant importunity. Places, penſions, promiſes, ready money, the whole myſtery of eccleſiaſtical patronage, all like the faith of the Lord Lieutenant, were proſtituted on this occaſion.*" Vide "*Obſervations on the Mutiny Bill,*" p. 67.

I can-

I cannot conceive a greater outrage upon ſociety than theſe indiſcriminate and extraordinary charges contain: better the author had written the names under his pictures than to have left them thus to be applied at hazard, or as the perſonal malice and private reſentments of individuals one towards another in ſociety ſhall at leiſure ſuggeſt.

The ſcheme of the country parſon, who, over the communion-table where the ten commandments had been engraved, affixed a pariſhioner's name to each commandment which he would inſinuate he individually had broken, was certainly more honourable and more candid than the inſinuations of this pamphlet; yet I believe every body will ſay, that the parſon was more influenced by a deſire of gratifying his own perſonal malice, than by that of reforming his congregation.

The conduct of corrupt traffic deſcribed by the author in the adminiſtration of Lord

Lord Buckinghamſhire muſt have been extremely open, or the author muſt have been in a ſituation peculiarly advantageous for obſervation.

I wiſh to ſhew the author the danger of this ſpecies of ſatire in which he deals. "*If any thing*," ſays he, ſpeaking of the Mutiny-bill, "*could aggravate ſuch a meaſure, it is the conſideration that the motive was as profligate, as the law was miſchievous.*"

The motives of every man's conduct lie within his own breaſt, and they can only be inferred from external ſigns—indeed the charge of *a profligate motive* is nothing more than a concluſion in the mind of him who makes the charge, and ſhould therefore be urged with infinite caution. The injuſtice of acting otherwiſe when we draw concluſions from external appearances, to argue *a profligate motive*, will in no caſe appear more ſtrong than in that furniſhed upon this occaſion by the author himſelf.

Sup-

Suppoſing the pamphlet to have been written by the gentleman to whom univerſal opinion has aſcribed it, I can take upon me to ſay that there is not a man of purer *motives* in the kingdom, not one more attached to the preſervation of the peace of the nation, and the ſafety of his ſovereign in his crown and dignity. Yet if a malicious, or an over-zealous partizan, urged by "*an ariſtocratic impatience under* a charge of *periſhed principle and execrated character*," ſhould inſtitute an enquiry into the *motives* which had influenced the author to write and publiſh the pamphlet in queſtion; is he not furniſhed with materials upon which to form an haſty opinion, that the *motives* were as *proſligate* as they were ſeditious?

Would he not reaſon thus? The author of the pamphlet has ſtated a law of the laſt ſeſſions of the Iriſh parliament, as likely to prove injurious to the liberties of the people: he has ſtated this law as proceeding from a combination of treacherous deſign in government,

vernment, and extreme corruption in parliament: he has ſtated it as having been enacted againſt the intereſt and wiſhes of an armed people, whom he deſcribes, not as uſing force, but "*ſtanding by, giving a ſilent conſidence to liberty.*" He could not expect that his pamphlet would have the effect to reform the majority of ſuch a parliament, men "*loſt in the public eſtimation, conſcious of public deteſtation, ſupported by public money!*" As little could he hope to produce reformation in an hardened court, the *irreſponſible* and unceaſing contrivers of Ireland's ruin. What then remained? Would it not follow in his concluſion, that the author's only *motive* was to convert the "*ſtanding by*" of the Volunteers into an active principle of FALLING ON, by which he might exterminate the majority of that parliament which he could entertain no hopes of rendering honeſt. He would charge him with a deſign to accompliſh the repeal of the perpetual Mutiny-law, the evil of which is only in ſpecula-

tion

tion, by the bloody and deſtructive progreſs of a civil war in his country. Under this mode of reaſoning and concluſion, could we ſave the humanity of the author of the pamphlet, but by a ſacrifice of his judgment, or his judgment but by yielding up his humanity! Perhaps in the exultation of ungenerous triumph, his adverſary would offer him, in the words of his own pamphlet, "*a retreat for a very vicious conduct in a very bad underſtanding.*" He likewiſe would not be wanting to collect from the pamphlet, in aid of his reaſoning, ſuch paſſages as ſhould ſeem to favour his concluſion. He would probably urge the following quotation as demonſtrative of the author's *motive*. "*The ſpirit of the nation is high, her miniſters diſtracted, her liberty in force, her volunteers numerous, and the miſchief of a military government ſuſpended by an armed people.*" Nor, probably, would he forget that the *queſtion of their legality is* LOST IN THEIR NUMBERS.

In the ſame ſpirit of malice perhaps he would urge that the *motive* of the author of the pamphlet appeared in the very firſt page of his book, where an animadverſion on the ſocial diſpoſition of the country is coupled with the clumſy good-humour of the inhabitants, and both are introduced as circumſtances of political ſupineneſs. The lean habit of Caſſius was an object of the ſagacious Cæſar's apprehenſion, who wiſhed rather that thoſe about him ſhould ſleep a nights, and perhaps be guilty of a little *clumſy good-humour*, than dedicate their vigils at the ſhrine of ſedition. Men of the conſtitution dreaded by Cæſar are born with a diſpoſition to conſider ſociety as always having need of reformation.—They ſhrink from *the hearty intercourſe of private life*, and are apt to feel every effort of *good-humour* as a *clumſy* burden. If to the coldneſs of this ſocial character there is unfortunately joined a warm ambitious deſire for perſonal diſtinction, the heated particles of the latter part of the character, meeting with the chilly damps of the

the former, too often produce a mental *volcano*, the lava of which finding vent in ſeditious pamphlets, ruſhes forth impetuouſly on the public, and threatens deſolation to all around. Thus would the man reaſon, who was intereſted in miſrepreſenting our author's *motive* for the publication of his pamphlet.

Whatever may have been his motive, the fact is, that the people of this country are perfectly ſatisfied with our preſent commercial and political condition. I ſpeak not of the Sugar-bakers, nor of the Committee of Merchants of Dublin, whoſe intereſt is inverſely exactly as that of the people in general. I ſpeak of the kingdom at large. By the bye the reſolutions of ſome of our armed corps here, laſt year, expreſſive of their diſapprobation of the conduct of parliament in the laſt days of the laſt ſeſſions, aroſe entirely from a diſappointment in the article of the Sugar Duty. The Merchants Corps, compoſed for the moſt part of perſons intereſted in the trade of Dublin, and influ-

influenced exceedingly by the Sugar-bakers and by the Committee of Merchants of Dublin, led the way in this expreſſion of diſcontent. Their example was followed, as well as I remember, but by the corps over which Sir Edward Newenham preſided, and by that of which Mr. James Napper Tandy was then a member. Had the cauſe of diſſatisfaction been well founded, complaints had been univerſal, and every corps in the kingdom would have joined in them. But I now ſee, with pleaſure, that not even the zeal and abilities of the author of the pamphlet can raiſe a murmur.

The Roman Catholics of Ireland, for whoſe edification the author has been at the pains to compoſe a moſt enthuſiaſtic metaphorical piece of eloquence, needed no inſpiration to determine their loyalty and gratitude to the illuſtrious houſe of Brunſwic. Indeed our zealous anceſtors took ſpecial care to throw them, inevitably, into the arms of the prerogative, not merely by putting

putting them out of the protection of the laws, but by afflicting them with a code, made excluſively for themſelves, which, for ſeverity and perſecution, no leſs in political than religious concerns, would have done honour to the invention of an inquiſition. Like mice, confined in the air-pump of a cruel philoſopher, they have been ſuffered to breathe but by experiment; and they now perceive that from the acceſſion of George I. to the preſent hour, they have been indebted to the mildneſs and humanity of the executive authority of the ſtate alone, for an exemption from extermination in the land of their inheritance. Their loyalty hath kept pace with their obligations; and I will be bold to ſay that no prince in Chriſtendom hath a more perfect ſecurity of fidelity in his ſubjects, than our moſt gracious ſovereign poſſeſſes in the hearts of the Iriſh Roman Catholics. Revolutions have not been favourable to them, and it were ſtrange infatuation indeed if, at this hour, they could be induced to join in factious clamour, and to add

their

their weight to a party, whose success upon every struggle has been succeeded by fresh acts of legislative tyranny over them. In patience and forbearance they have worn out the tedious night of their affliction, and when the dawn of civil and religious toleration begins to light them to a new day, it is not likely that they will cloud it with projects of turbulency and of discontent. The prerogative alone, for near a century, has been the shield of their defence. Pride as well as gratitude will incite them to protect its lustre, nor suffer its polish to be sullied by the rude finger of faction.

The state has nothing to fear from the Roman Catholics of Ireland!

Our people begin to find generally, by an experience of export and import, belying all seditious theory, that their trade is opened in the most unequivocal extent. They know that the acquisition of constitution is, in its own nature, a progressive thing; and that, in this respect, Ireland has

has acquired more in the laſt ſeſſions of parliament, than England had done in any century, ſave only one, of her whole political exiſtence.

They now ſee that their conſtitution had been ſhackled only for the purpoſe of ſecuring to Great-Britain a monopoly in their trade; and that the cauſe being removed the effect muſt ceaſe.

They ſee the difficulties in which England is at preſent involved, and they do not mean to add to her calamity by an unſeaſonable demand of the redreſs of ſpeculative grievances.

When they behold her, like that great inſtrument of her glory, a ſhip of war, toſſed about in a tempeſtuous ſea, and that deſtruction is threatened on all ſides, they feel how impolitic a thing it would be in the hands to mutiny. Prudence and kind offices, upon this occaſion, may for ever bury in oblivion the circumſtances of former contentions.